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THE RETURN OF J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE FBI’S REVERSION TO
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
By Zehra Naqvi*

Q

: Which method(s) are you comfortable with the FBI
employing to shore up our domestic security?
a) Active investigation of a Quaker-affiliated organization1
b) Recording the license plate numbers of
peaceful environmentalist protestors2
c) Monitoring anti-war demonstrations3
d) Intercepting emails by political activists4
e) All of the above.

If you answered “e,” you’re in luck. You’re on board with
the FBI’s current efforts to make us safer. If, on the other hand,
you don’t recall authorizing such tactics to enhance your security
and feel that they are vaguely reminiscent of McCarthyism-era
tactics, join the club. Our tax dollars are being wasted on collecting more useless information instead of analyzing the useful
information we already have.
After the domestic spying outrage that occurred in the 1950s
and 1960s, we had safeguards put into effect to prevent exactly
these kinds of activity from occurring again, but they were dismantled by this Administration; the Administration played on
our fears about a repeat of 9/11 and claimed that our security was
at risk by the restrictive nature of the guidelines. In fact, the
guidelines were protecting us from ourselves or the FBI manifestation of us. Watering them down is an attempt to hoodwink the
American population into sanctioning the removal of the safeguards and allowing the FBI to break the bargain made in the
1970s to refrain from engaging in such political intelligence
gathering. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is beating its drums to warn the public and hoping that we, the courts,
and Congress hear the call and respond.

THE BARGAIN: A HISTORY OF THE GUIDELINES
“Knowledge is the key to control. Secrecy should no
longer be allowed to shield the existence of constitutional,
legal and moral problems from the scrutiny of all three
branches of government or from the American people
themselves.”5
Church Committee Report

The FBI’s chief focus in the 1950s and 1960s was rooting
out Communism, and to that end, the civil liberties of many individuals and groups were violated as the FBI pursued them without any evidence or reasonable suspicion that any of them had
actually committed any crimes.6 The political impetus to quash
Communism rallied the agency into conducting heightened domestic surveillance based on political ideology, stifling dissent,
and political opposition.7 The FBI, under the auspices of DirecFall 2005

tor J. Edgar Hoover, ran a counterintelligence program,
“COINTELPRO,” which investigated prominent activists and
groups such as the National Organization for Women and the
American Indian Movement.8 Ward Churchill’s book, The
COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars
Against Dissent in the United States, documents some of the
strategies employed by the FBI in its domestic “war against dissent.”9 As revelations of the FBI’s investigatory abuses surfaced, Congress held hearings and in 1975, the Senate initiated
an investigation into the abuses.10
The Church Committee found that “the FBI had infiltrated
civil rights and peace groups, had burglarized political groups to
gain information about their members and activities, and had
‘swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives,
views, and associations of American citizens.’”11 The Committee Report declared that there was “a consistent pattern in which
programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what
witnesses characterized as ‘vacuum cleaners,’ sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens.”12 The FBI
had created files on over one million Americans, investigated the
NAACP for 25 years, compiled information on student groups
for use in future applications to government jobs, and had a plan
“to summarily arrest thousands of Americans in case of a national emergency.”13
The Committee’s final report noted that “too often intelligence has lost its focus and domestic intelligence activities have
invaded individual privacy and violated the rights of lawful assembly and political expression. Unless new and tighter controls
are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities
threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally
alter its nature.”14 The report stated that a rise in Executive
power, secrecy, and avoidance of the rule of law were the conditions that facilitated the abusive practices.15 The report concluded “the ultimate goal is a statutory mandate for the federal
government's domestic security function that will ensure that the
FBI, as the primary domestic security investigative agency, concentrates upon criminal conduct as opposed to political rhetoric
or association.”16
The Committee recommended prohibitions on the FBI, forbidding the agency from continuing its tactics of discrediting
political opposition, media manipulation, distorting data to influence government policy and public perceptions, and preventing
the free exchange of ideas.17 The Committee sought to achieve
these ends by recommending that the FBI refrain from: 1) collecting or disseminating information for a federal official for a
political purpose; 2) interfering with constitutionally protected
advocacy activities; 3) harassing individuals or physically intimi3

dating them through obvious surveillance and interviews; and 4)
maintaining dossiers on the political inclinations and private
lives of Americans unless the demands of national security warrant such activities.18
Attorney General Edward Levi issued new guidelines for
FBI investigations in response to these findings, setting a higher
standard for domestic surveillance by the FBI.19 Since the
guidelines were adopted with legislative “consultation and oversight” through the Church Committee’s investigation and report,
the guidelines have a “quasi-legislative status,” but did not have
the force of actual legislation.20 Because the FBI adopted new
guidelines for itself, the legislative effort to develop an FBI
charter was abandoned.21 Until Attorney General Ashcroft’s
unilateral changes to the guidelines in 2002, all revisions of the
guidelines were made with Congressional consultation and oversight.22
Attorney General Levi’s guidelines “specified that investigations should be limited to exposing criminal conduct and
should not involve simple monitoring of unpopular political
views.”23 The FBI could only initiate investigations “where
‘specific and articulable facts’ indicated criminal activity.”24
Unpopular ideologies or political dissent were not considered
sufficient reasons to justify an investigation or restraint on
someone’s free practice of their First Amendment rights.25 The
guidelines were somewhat diluted in the 1980s, but remained
largely intact until Attorney General John Ashcroft changed
them in 2002.26

mestic surveillance. It is therefore highly unlikely that the rollback of the domestic guidelines was meant to facilitate catching
terrorists abroad.31 In effect, the revised rules blur the lines between international and domestic surveillance guidelines, denying American citizens the protections they have thus far enjoyed
by subjecting them to greater invasions of privacy.32
The three basic results of the changed guidelines are that
without any “scintilla of suspicion”33 or guidance as to what
information must be recorded or how long a group can be monitored, the FBI can: 1) attend domestic public group meetings; 2)
mine various commercial databases and share the information;
and 3) cut down on internal review procedures, essentially
eliminating a level of scrutiny.34
In addition to threatening the civil liberties of groups and
individuals and risking a return to gathering political intelligence on groups, the changed guidelines also pose the serious
risk of undermining efficient intelligence gathering since the
“vacuum cleaner” approach will be reinstalled in place of targeted intelligence-gathering efforts; more information might
undermine the agency’s ability to sift through and analyze its
usefulness, and thereby actually hamper the fight against terrorism.35 The guidelines adopted by Attorney General Levi “were
intended to make the FBI’s security operations more efficient by
tying FBI inquiries and investigations to some modest showing
that they were focused on suspected criminal or terrorist activity
for security reasons.”36 The recent revisions detract from this
goal and reverse the positive trend of the past half century.37

BREAKING THE BARGAIN: ASHCROFT’S REVISION OF
THE GUIDELINES

THE AFTERMATH: BAD HABITS DIE HARD

Eight months after the September 11th attacks, Attorney
General Ashcroft unilaterally revised the guidelines without
consulting with Congress, claiming that the FBI’s hands were
tied on its terrorism investigations as a result of the old guidelines.27 The revised guidelines allowed the FBI to “freely infiltrate mosques, churches, and synagogues and other houses of
worship, listen in on online chat rooms and read message
boards” without any indication of criminal activity, substantially
lowering the barriers to civil liberty violations and increasing the
likelihood that the FBI will be inundated with more information.28 This essentially reversed the work of the Church Committee and marked the return of practices that were sanctioned
under Hoover’s FBI reign, when the FBI engaged in “political
intelligence” gathering, stealing membership lists of suspect
organizations, and gathering vast amounts of information on
innocent constitutionally protected activities.29 This is especially disturbing because the Attorney General Levi’s adoption
of the guidelines is what prevented Congress from enacting legislation to ensure that the FBI observe the rule of law and adhere
to strict guidelines on opening and maintaining investigations.30
Arguably, the changes are further unwarranted because international terrorism investigations have generally been conducted under a separate body of foreign intelligence guidelines
that have traditionally been more lax than those governing do4

News articles over the past two years demonstrate that recent surveillance activities of political demonstrations are raising public concerns that the FBI is once again engaging in questionable practices.38 Some of these activities are conducted
through the new domestic surveillance program, made up of
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), which partners local law
enforcement with federal agents and other officers to combat
terrorism.39 The Associated Press reported that “[t]here are terrorism task forces in 100 cities and with more than 3,700 members, including at least 2,000 FBI agents, state and local police,
and other federal law enforcement officials. More than half of
the task forces were formed after the terror attacks of Sept. 11,
2001.”40 In total, there are 66 JTTFs.41
The amended guidelines opened the door for JTTFs to engage in many forms of domestic spying, specifically by allowing
law enforcement to have free reign on monitoring online activities, private sector databases, and religious houses of worship,
and once again being able to monitor innocuous First Amendment activities without indication of any criminal activity, as the
old guidelines required.
The public should be concerned that current spying efforts
are too broad, that these efforts have not only constituted an
inefficient use of resources, but have also had a chilling effect
on First Amendment freedoms.42 The public does not want their
tax dollars spent for spying on groups that merely engage in
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civil disobedience nor do they want to “return to the days when
peaceful critics become the subject of government investigations”43 The ACLU asserts that the FBI has been compiling
license plate numbers from environmental and other group protests, monitoring peaceful demonstrations, intercepting emails,
and trading political intelligence information with other law
enforcement agencies.44 A New York Times article cited an FBI
memo about monitoring demonstrations as proof, stating that
there is “a coordinated nationwide effort to collect intelligence
regarding demonstrations.”45 This article also cited a recent suit
against the government, brought by critics of the current administration that found themselves on the “no-fly” lists after September 11th, as signaling “a return to the abuses of the 1960s and
1970s, when J. Edgar Hoover was the FBI director and agents
routinely spied on political protestors like the Rev. Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.”46 The article quoted the executive director of
the ACLU as saying, “[t]he FBI is dangerously targeting Americans who are engaged in nothing more than lawful protest and
dissent...[t]he line between terrorism and legitimate civil disobedience is blurred.”47

THE LAWSUIT: THE ACLU BEATING ITS DRUMS
Perhaps the biggest concern of all is the widespread ignorance as to how the JTTFs operates and the extent of collaboration between state legal enforcement entities and the FBI.48 In
an effort to get a better understanding of the procedures and
rules of operation behind the JTTFs, the ACLU recently filed a
lawsuit to seek expedited processing of its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding general JTTF procedures
and any information it might have collected on specific environmental, religious, and civil liberty groups. To enhance the lawsuit, the ACLU partnered with the American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee, Greenpeace, People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, and United for Peace and Justice, in filing its lawsuit against the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF) and Department of Justice in DC.49 The lawsuit requests
injunctive relief to intervene in the expedited processing of the
FOIA requests regarding the composition and procedures of the
taskforce and the criteria that JTTFs use to select who to investigate.50
The Freedom of Information Act (1966) is significant as it
established a federal law that recognized the right of the public
to request information from federal government agencies.51
There are exceptions as to what information can be requested,
and some information may be redacted for security, confidentiality, or other reasons.52 The national security exception may be
used to block a FOIA request such as this one, because it asks
for information regarding the inner workings of the JTTFs.53
According to 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(iv), requestors who
want the government to expedite their requests by processing
these requests out of sequence seek expedited treatment and
must demonstrate:
(i) Circumstances in which the lack of expedited treatment could reasonably be expected to pose an imFall 2005

minent threat to the life or physical safety of an
individual;
(ii) An urgency to inform the public about an actual or
alleged federal government activity, if made by a
person primarily engaged in disseminating information;
(iii) The loss of substantial due process rights; or
(iv) A matter of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about
the government's integrity which affect public confidence (emphasis added).
The ACLU filed this lawsuit after the FBI failed to respond
to their request for expedited processing of their FOIA requests.54 The ACLU argues that it is entitled to expedite processing on the grounds of the second and fourth conditions.55
Specifically, because the fear of “increased surveillance of political, religious, and community organizations by the FBI”
might chill public participation in political activity, the ACLU,
by virtue of its activities in defense of civil rights and civil liberties, is an entity “primarily engaged in disseminating information,”56 and thus has standing to seek such processing:
There has been growing public concern about the
FBI’s monitoring, surveillance, and infiltration of
organizations on the basis of national origin, racial
and/or ethnic background, religious affiliation, organizational membership, political views or affiliation, or participation in protest activities or demonstrations . . . [there has also been] cooperation between the FBI and local law enforcement to monitor peaceful political demonstrations . . . [and] numerous published reports of FBI agents questioning
or spying on peace activists, anti-war activists, and
person of Arab or Muslim background.57
As a result, the ACLU asked the FBI to turn over all records
regarding any of the plaintiffs in this action.58 Additionally,
they requested all “records relating to the purpose, mission, and
activities of JTTFs,” particularly those pertaining to domestic
surveillance on the basis of political views. The ACLU argues
that the FBI has 1) failed to disclose any responsive records, and
2) is improperly withholding the requested records.59
The defendants responded on July 5, 2005 by arguing that:
1) the ACLU has not met its burden for showing that expedited
processing is appropriate; 2) “compelling need” is a narrow
standard that is not met here; and 3) denial of such processing is
subject to judicial review under a deferential standard.60 They
also averred that the ACLU’s two FOIA requests encompassed
93 subject matters and the FBI was going through its findings in
a “methodical, organized approach.”61
The defendants concluded that based on the articles cited by
the ACLU, there is no current “exceptional media interest” or
“urgency to inform the public,” since the media reports date
back to 2004 and many of them do not directly mention the
JTTFs or the plaintiffs.62 It also argues that the ACLU is not an
entity “primarily engaged in disseminating information,” but
5

rather a “litigation organization.”63 The overall case of the defendants seems to be that the ACLU is merely citing its own
concerns and that there is no real media interest or urgency to
inform the public.64 They also caution that to allow this request
to be expedited would open the floodgates to the ACLU and
other organizations who want their requests fulfilled ahead of
others on matters that are not sufficiently pressing.65 The defendants, therefore, requested that the Court “(i) deny plaintiff’s
motion for a preliminary injunction; (ii) grant defendants’ crossmotion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for
expedited FOIA processing; and (iii) grant a stay of proceedings
to permit further processing of the FOIA requests at issue.”66
The ACLU, in its reply on July 19, 2005, countered that
there is, in fact, a widespread media interest in the subject, and
that their record of articles was merely exemplary, not allinclusive.67 Furthermore, the ACLU argued that the articles date
back to 2004 because the FOIA requests were filed in 2004 and
the FBI’s own delays in responding are to blame for the articles
being outdated.68 The ACLU also argues that the FBI is making
a “circular argument,” whereby the ACLU must demonstrate
that files were maintained on it and the other plaintiffs in order
to get the files about them, it is asking the ACLU to prove what
it is trying to find out.69 The articles suggest that there has been
“targeted monitoring and surveillance of Muslim and Arab
Americans” and the problem is pervasive, urgent, and ongoing
and thus merits close scrutiny by examination of the records.70
Additionally, though the ACLU works to defend civil rights and
civil liberties and uses litigation as one strategy to accomplish
its work, it engages in the dissemination of information by publishing reports and newsletters, issuing email alerts, and uploading such content on its website to further raise awareness about
important issues.71
The ACLU further points out that the one document the FBI
has handed over “confirms the relevance of [the] articles to the
subject of plaintiff’s requests” by showing that the FBI closely
monitored United for Peace and Justice’s website and peaceful
protests leading up to the Republican and Democratic national
conventions and the 2004 election, noting its anti-war rhetoric
and incorrectly describing it an “anarchist group.”72 The general
public, the media, and legislators themselves have demonstrated
a strong interest in the FBI’s activities and want to ensure that
civil liberties are not being unjustly infringed in the name of
national security.73 The Court should not grant a stay in proceedings, but rather grant the motion for a preliminary injunction, entitling the ACLU to expedited processing of its requests,
or at least set up a reasonable schedule for the FBI to comply
with the ACLU’s request.74

SEEKING RECORDS, SEEKING CHANGE
Whether or not the ACLU and its fellow plaintiffs succeed
in getting the records they seek, it is unlikely that they will get
all the information they want. The lawsuit and the overall campaign against increasingly intrusive FBI surveillance may, however, meet other types of success. The ACLU’s campaign and
6

lawsuit raises awareness about the FBI’s activities and might
pressure Congress to conduct an investigation and issue binding
guidelines on the agency. It is important to ensure that the
amended guidelines do not enable the agency to return to its pre1976 era practices. Since Ashcroft unilaterally changed the
guidelines, dismantling the bargain struck years ago when the
creation of a FBI charter was abandoned, Congress should once
again look closely at what the FBI is doing and how it is carrying out domestic surveillance. Political intelligence gathering is
reprehensible and a misuse of resources at a critical time for
national security.
The public deserves to know how its state and federal resources are being allocated for investigations and whether needless investigations are wasting resources. The lack of information and heightened secrecy of FBI procedures signal that we are
regressing to old patterns and using domestic surveillance as a
weapon against innocent Americans, thereby wasting resources
and inundating our intelligence personnel with too much useless
information. When the FBI wastes resources in this way, the
remaining resources dedicated to analysis of the helpful information fall short. Furthermore, such publicity and any information that is released might also compel states to reevaluate their
level of participation on JTTF activities and strengthen their
resolve to balance the need to combat terrorism with costeffective, targeted, and reasonable investigations, instead of
overarching strategies to keep ongoing terror investigations.
The lack of Congressional oversight on the 2002 guideline
changes and the increased threat they pose to civil liberties
should compel Congress to take a more active stance on the
FBI’s activities. Some recommendations for how Congress
might place a check on the FBI’s activities are requiring: (1)
“prior notice and meaningful consultation before future guideline changes can take effect;” (2) “the adoption, following Congressional consultation and comment, of Guidelines for collection, use, disclosure and retention of public event information
and data mining;” (3) reports on the impact of the guidelines on
open society, free speech, and privacy, costs, and benefits; and
(4) public reporting of statistical information regarding the number, duration, and cost of investigative inquiries.75
Domestic surveillance is not a means to peek into the homes
and lives of our neighbors to discover whether they hold unpopular political or religious views, but is instead a means of
getting critical information about domestic threats. It should be
executed through targeted investigations without unnecessarily
compromising the civil liberties of American citizens who are
merely protesting government policies on different subject matters. The FBI’s focus has not remained on one group. First it
was Communists, but gradually, the scope broadened to include
people who opposed the political administration. The spotlight
is currently turned onto Muslims and Arabs, but it will inevitably continue to enlarge in scope to peer into the activities and
opinions of environmental, political advocacy groups, and other
organizations and individuals, simply because the machinery is
in place to do so, and there is no red light to stop the FBI. The
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articles mentioned earlier in this article and in the lawsuit suggest that the scope has already enlarged. At this moment, the
Court has the power to signal a clear red light allowing expedited processing of the requests. Otherwise, the FBI will take it
as a green light to continue its activities and fail in its responsibility to comply with the request. If the Court grants a stay,
Congress should be on alert that it has the final opportunity and
responsibility to ask the necessary and vital questions about

JTTF procedures, protocols, and findings. Increasingly, the domestic surveillance vehicle meant to protect us from domestic
threats poses one of the most serious threats to our civil liberties
and while the power of change rests with Congress, the responsibility to push for it rests with us.
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